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Abstract: This paper discusses the UK’s climate diplomacy towards emerging countries. The UK as an established power and as a member of the European Union appears keen to play a leadership role in climate cooperation, both within the EU and at the multilateral level. However, as in other areas of international politics, emerging countries are becoming increasingly important players for dealing with climate change. In this sense leadership on the part of the UK would require some constructive engagement of these countries. The paper looks at how the UK engages emerging countries, both on its own and in coordination with its EU partners. It addresses both multilateral and bilateral diplomacy efforts. It argues that although the UK is making an effort to engage emerging countries, these are still at an early stage, and they also suffer from a lack of resources and strategic direction. Some policy diffusion is observed in relation to China, but this has not translated to the convergence of positions in climate negotiations. It concludes that the possibility of influence is constrained by limited resources and the degree of coincidence of interests between the UK/EU and emerging countries. 
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Introduction:
Like so many other areas of international politics, climate politics is increasingly characterised by multipolarity. The main Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emitters come from both developed and developing countries. Traditional, or established powers, like the United States and the European Union have seen their share of global emissions diminish compared to that of rapidly industrialising or ‘emerging’ countries like China and India. Specifically China is now responsible for 28% of global GHG emissions, with the US and EU matching this level only through their combined emissions profile (16% and 11% respectively)​[1]​.  Therefore, the established powers cannot provide a solution to climate change mitigation and adaptation without the contribution of emerging powers. In the context of this special issue this paper looks at whether the UK as an established power is adjusting its diplomatic behaviour in order to respond to this increased multipolarity in the field of climate politics. Such adjustment would consist of an increased attempt to engage emerging powers, while continuing to work with its traditional allies (US, Europe). 
The UK is a relatively progressive climate actor, compared to most non-EU-15 countries. Although arguably not the most progressive within the EU​[2]​, it has gradually embraced the climate agenda and eventually set high domestic targets for emissions reductions. Its Climate Change Act (CCA) of 2008 stipulates a long term binding commitment to reduce emissions by 50% of 1990 levels by 2025, and by 80% by 2050. It is the first country in the world to have made such a legally binding long term commitment. The UK is also a member of the EU and coordinates both domestic climate legislation and negotiating positions with other EU member states. Climate policy is a shared competence between the EU and its member states, and therefore it is impossible to understand the UK’s climate policy without reference to the EU. Shared competence means that both the member states and the EU can exercise competence in an issue area, but EU law supersedes any member state’s law. Therefore, the autonomy of the UK to legislate in climate policy is constrained by EU competence​[3]​, although the UK as a large member state can have influence on EU legislation in this area.
The EU is also considered a progressive climate actor when compared to other developed countries. It has long adopted the climate agenda as an important issue and has taken up (and kept) commitments for mitigation measures under the Kyoto Protocol and beyond, with its 2020 package in 2008 and most recently the 2030 commitments agreed in late 2014. Both itsinternal and EU commitments to climate mitigation suggest that the UK has an interest in advancing the goal of climate change mitigation and adaptation at the international level, which in turn means that it has an interest in engaging emerging countries and ensuring they become more progressive climate actors themselves. To what extent is the UK engaging these countries, and how successful is this engagement?
The paper will assess the level of engagement with emerging countries at two distinct levels of interaction. The first part will look at multilateral climate diplomacy, which mostly takes place within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). At this level the UK mostly acts in cooperation with other EU states as prescribed by EU treaties on shared competence and external representation, so both the UK and EU’s climate diplomacy will be assessed. The second part will look at bilateral climate diplomacy towards emerging countries outside the UNFCCC. Again, both UK and EU bilateral climate diplomacy will be assessed in this section, since the UK actively participates in EU bilateral initiatives. 
The analysis will draw on government and international documents and reports, as well as on secondary literature. It will mostly concentrate on the post-Kyoto period of climate negotiations, as this period represents both a distinct period in UK climate politics, with the adoption of the Climate Change Act signalling a new domestic bargain on climate, and a distinct phase in the climate negotiations, where the distinction between developed and developing countries started eroding with the expectation that developing countries would start taking on some mitigation commitments. 

UK and EU multilateral climate diplomacy
The UK’s multilateral diplomacy is mostly exercised in the context of the negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In this context, the UK rarely acts alone, as the EU member states regularly coordinate their negotiating positions as per the treaty provisions on shared competence and external representation. Individual EU member states also send their own delegations, but these tend to spend a lot of time coordinating positions rather than representing their own country’s interests. For the UK it makes sense to act through the EU, since the UK on its own only represents 1.5% of global emissions, whereas the EU as a whole represents around 11% of emissions and as a collective is a much bigger player than any of its individual countries, including big member states like the UK.
EU climate diplomacy has two elements in which the UK has the potential to play important roles. One is the internal EU climate policy, which can make an impact on EU credibility in negotiations. The other is the EU negotiating position and strategy, which is developed through coordination between the member states. In relation to the EU’s internal climate policy, the UK as a large member state has played an important role, but not always a leading or progressive role. Its record as a climate actor within the EU is quite mixed. On the positive side, the UK has undertaken a large amount of the reduction needed to achieve the EU’s Kyoto targets, and, having overachieved on its own target has actually provided room for some members to do less​[4]​. The UK has also supported relatively ambitious targets in the negotiations of the 2008 package of the EU’s targets for 2020, and supported upgrading the EU’s commitment to 30%, even after other major emitters refused to take binding commitments at the Copenhagen Conference​[5]​. In the recent negotiations over the EU’s 2030 targets, the UK again was one of the most progressive voices, arguing for a 40% reduction​[6]​. It formed a group with other progressive EU states like Germany in order to persuade the more reluctant Eastern European states to accept the higher targets​[7]​. However, when it comes to individual policies, the UK has also played a laggard role. For example it has consistently opposed and attempted to weaken binding renewable energy targets, both in the 2020​[8]​ and 2030 package negotiations​[9]​. This has been criticised by a variety of green businesses and by NGOs​[10]​. In this sense the UK’s influence on EU climate target setting is not entirely on the positive side, but overall it has had a more positive than negative influence in the post-Kyoto period.
It is more difficult to determine the role of the UK in EU multilateral climate diplomacy; this is because the inner workings of determining the negotiating position and tactics are not really transparent​[11]​, which makes it difficult to distinguish the influence of particular member states. The negotiating position is adopted by consensus, and any change in strategy or any adjustment to the position needs to be coordinated during the negotiations themselves, with any member able to veto changes​[12]​. In that sense, the EU position may not represent UK interests exactly, but the UK can block decisions that it considers against its interests. In addition, member states have the opportunity to make more of an impact during their Presidency, when they take the lead in negotiations​[13]​. The UK last held the EU presidency in the second half of 2005, when it played a constructive role in the Conference of the Parties (COP) in Montreal, maintaining the momentum for the Kyoto Protocol entry into force​[14]​. In earlier phases of the climate regime, the UK has attempted to use the UNFCCC negotiations as a way to limit the extension of EU competence on climate policy​[15]​. This largely came from the UK’s scepticism over the expansion of EU competence in areas outside the common market​[16]​. However, the UK has become more positive about working through the EU since the early 2000s, and has since played a more constructive role within EU climate diplomacy in the UNFCCC. It is therefore useful to briefly examine how the EU (and by extension, the UK) has attempted to engage developing countries in the post-Kyoto climate negotiations.
The EU considers itself a climate leader, and has adopted a variety of policies to decrease its emissions in accordance with the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol. It has increasingly acknowledged, however, that emerging countries as large developing country emitters also need to take action to control their burgeoning emissions. How is the EU attempting to persuade emerging powers to take on mitigation measures, and are its efforts constructive/are they compatible with emerging countries’ needs and priorities? Its record appears mixed: on the negative side, the EU tends to emphasise top-down, legally binding commitments, whereas emerging countries prefer voluntary commitments in order to avoid restricting their economic growth. Also, in 2012 the EU attempted to ‘arm-twist’ other emitters, including emerging powers, by extending its Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) to aviation and including all flights to and from Europe in the scheme. This added extra costs to foreign airlines, and created quite a lot of friction between the EU, the US and China, until the issue was moved to the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and inclusion of these foreign airlines in the ETS was dropped​[17]​. Finally, the EU seemed quite isolated and lacked influence in the Copenhagen Conference of 2009. It’s promise to move from 20% to 30% reductions if other emitters took action seemed to fall on deaf ears, and the final deal was hammered out between the US and BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) countries, leaving the EU’s ‘leadership’ image tarnished​[18]​.
On the positive side, however, the EU has been quite willing to explore the financial needs of developing countries and has contributed to the financial mechanisms of the UNFCCC, such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), whose primary market is the EU ETS​[19]​. Most CDM projects and funding are located in emerging economies. In addition, the EU has been responsive to the demand by developing and emerging economies for a second Kyoto period, and has agreed to put its Copenhagen pledge for 20% reduction into this legally binding agreement. Therefore, although the EU is not entirely amenable to all the demands of emerging countries, it has been more flexible than other developed countries, such as the US. It has agreed to take more of the burden of mitigation under the common but differentiated responsibilities principle enshrined in the UNFCCC. And despite its insistence on legally binding commitments, in Durban it agreed to the term ‘legal force’ to be used for the future climate agreement in Paris in 2015, despite the ambiguity that this term implies. For these reasons the EU multilateral diplomacy, to which the UK contributes, provides an overall positive picture in relation to constructive engagement of emerging countries. 
Outside its efforts within the EU and the UNFCCC, the UK has also made climate change a priority in other multilateral fora, like the UN and the G8. For example, in 2007 it introduced a discussion on climate change to the UN Security Council, even though other major powers like the US and China were opposed to discussing this issue at this high level forum​[20]​. However, since the financial crisis and the unrest in the Middle East climate change has diminished as a high level politics issue on the international agenda. Also, the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government has not shown as much willingness to pursue the issue outside the UNFCCC.
From the discussion so far the UK’s behaviour in multilateral climate politics appears overall positive and progressive, particularly in the post-Kyoto period, but also at earlier points in time. In more recent years (post-2008) the UK has remained committed to climate action at the international level, but has not been pursuing it as vocally and strongly as before the financial crisis. In relation to its engagement of emerging countries, however, there is little that can be gleamed from observing only its multilateral diplomacy, as this is mostly exercised via the EU. Looking at the UK’s bilateral relations with emerging powers will be more useful in determining its level of engagement.

UK and EU bilateral climate diplomacy with emerging powers:
The UK’s bilateral diplomacy with emerging countries is exercised at two levels: its own bilateral relations and the EU’s bilateral relations with these countries. Both the EU and the UK seek to influence the climate policies of emerging countries through bilateral climate cooperation. The UK has also played a very active role in the EU’s engagement of emerging countries and the signing of climate agreements between the EU and China in particular. Because the UK’s and the EU’s efforts are interconnected, this section will look at both sets of relationships. 
EU bilateral climate diplomacy:
EU bilateral diplomacy with emerging countries mainly relies on financial and technical instruments, in accordance with its broader role as an economic and normative power. Between 2007 and 2014 the European Investment Bank funded climate change related projects in China, India and Brazil for a total of 4.151 billion Euros (1.368 billion, 1.095 billion and 1.688 billion respectively)​[21]​. The EU bilateral relationship with China includes several agreements, such as the EU-China Climate Change Partnership agreement (concluded during the UK Presidency in 2005), the China-EU Action Plan on Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energies, the EU-China CDM Facilitation Project, the EU-China Near Zero Emissions Coal initiative (led by the UK), and a biennial EU-China Energy Conference​[22]​. All these initiatives aim to strengthen cooperation on climate change and in this way enhance China’s interest and capacities for climate change mitigation. The extent to which these efforts are bearing fruit in terms of influence in Chinese climate policy is hard to trace. Torney​[23]​ found some evidence of policy diffusion from EU to China, particularly in the form of lesson drawing: the various initiatives described above are helpful in promoting policy learning and diffusion to China. For example, the Chinese government consulted extensively with the EU Commission in its design of emission trading pilot schemes​[24]​. Lee also finds that China uses EU initiatives and policies as inspiration and draws lessons from the EU’s experience with climate policy:
“Evidence of policy learning transfers abound, from eco-labelling to support measures for renewable energy. The time lag between the EU enacting standards and China adopting them has gotten shorter in many policy areas, such as for vehicle emissions standards”​[25]​.
Further to cooperation on technical issues, the EU and member states also emphasised climate change in their meetings with high-level Chinese officials, keeping the issue on the agenda and thus helping to maintain the attention of the Chinese leadership to the issue​[26]​. However, Torney argues that ‘we cannot attribute too much influence to the EU’​[27]​ because there is evidence that the increased attention to climate change and the commitment to adopt climate measures was also a result of developments in thinking of domestic actors, such as the new Chinese leadership in 2002​[28]​ and the influence of domestic think tanks and institutes that supported climate action​[29]​. In this sense he finds that increased cooperation between China and the EU is a result of a change in domestic perceptions of interests in China rather than EU influence​[30]​. Lee comes to a similar conclusion:
“The EU (together with Japan and the US) has served as a ‘template’ for China, and hand-held many agencies and companies in China through the process. That said, it is harder to prove that the partnership changed the level of ambition of China, even though it is difficult to conceive of more Chinese commitment to carbon emissions without international pressure from the EU and the like”​[31]​. 
On top of this, the EU’s efforts in China are somewhat undermined by individual member states, who often compete with each other for commercial contracts in China, according to a House of Lords report​[32]​. The report suggests more strategic cooperation and a long-term vision are needed in order for EU member states to work together. 
The above discussion indicates that the EU is helping China in its development of climate policy, but has had limited influence in the change in the Chinese perception of interest in relation to its domestic climate policy. China’s acceptance of climate mitigation as a legitimate policy goal has little to do with EU influence. Furthermore, an increased Chinese interest in climate mitigation, as well as increased climate cooperation between the EU and China has not led to a convergence of positions of the two in climate negotiations. China continues to object to the dilution of the common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) principle in post-Kyoto negotiations and continues to support the distinction between Annex I and non-Annex I parties, which the EU wants to eliminate​[33]​. China also continues to reject binding emissions targets for emerging countries. Therefore, the EU’s influence in China is limited and constrained by the degree to which Chinese interests coincide with those of Europe.     
In relation to India, the EU has also made efforts to create bilateral cooperation on climate change. Again during the UK presidency in 2005 an India-EU Initiative of Clean Development and Climate Change was signed. This agreement also created an EU-India Environment Forum and an EU-India Energy Panel. However, the policy goals in the EU-India agreement were very vague. In addition, not much action seems to have taken place to realise any of the terms of the agreement, as in 2008 the same goals were restated in a new agreement for a Joint Programme for Cooperation on Energy, Clean Development and Climate Change. However, not much has resulted from the Joint Programme either ​[34]​. Cooperation on climate change between the EU and India is limited and more joint projects have taken place in other environmental issues rather than climate change​[35]​. India has cooperated with individual member states like Germany, Spain and the UK on renewable energy projects​[36]​. But it has resisted closer cooperation with the EU and it rejected the EU’s offer to fund a Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) demonstration plan​[37]​. Torney​[38]​ argues this is because India has very different priorities to the EU in relation to climate change, and as a result is resisting policy diffusion from the EU​[39]​. In particular, India still prioritises economic growth and poverty alleviation above climate change mitigation and to the extent that it is interested in renewable energy this is mostly in order to achieve energy security and economic growth and less about achieving climate goals​[40]​. India therefore considers that their priorities are very different from those of the EU and this has also meant that India and the EU have quite divergent positions in climate negotiations: the EU supports legally binding commitments for all major emitters regardless of level of development, although it is in favour of differentiating the level of ambition; India on the other hand tends to emphasise its need for development and resists the agenda of legally binding commitments​[41]​. India also emphasises equality in the sense of equal access to the atmosphere and rejects the label of ‘major emitter’ since as it argues it is only responsible for 2.3% of total accumulated emissions​[42]​ Because of this large disparity in worldviews between the EU and India, Wagner concludes that it is not really possible at least in the medium term for the EU to influence the Indian negotiating position​[43]​. However, he argues that there is scope for cooperation to take place in relation to emission reducing policies within India, particularly on renewable energy where there are common interests​[44]​. 
Finally, the EU has also attempted to engage Brazil in bilateral climate cooperation. Initially this took place as part of the EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership that was launched in 2007, but in 2011 the EU-Brazil summit launched a separate climate change dialogue. The main areas of cooperation between the EU and Brazil centre on renewable energy and battling deforestation. So far these initiatives remain mostly aspirational and have failed to produce concrete policies and projects​[45]​. Perhaps this is a result of the recent nature of cooperation. There is large potential for Brazil and the EU to cooperate on renewable energy, since both have shown a commitment to climate change mitigation​[46]​. Brazil is already cooperating with EU member states on renewable energy projects and the German government has funded a large part of a pilot programme on the protection of the Brazilian rainforest​[47]​. Both also have an interest in biofuels, but cooperation in this field has slightly been frustrated by the different commercial interests of the two sides: Brazilian sugarcane ethanol is considered environmentally damaging in the EU, who promotes rapeseed oil based biodiesel​[48]​. Despite these differences it is considered that the scope for cooperation is significant and since both the EU and Brazil have an interest in climate mitigation bilateral cooperation could increase in the future. At this point, however, it remains limited and in addition to this, Brazil has largely chosen to ally itself with the BASIC countries in the climate negotiations. Although its interests and positions are not as closely aligned to those of China and India, it also supports the CBDR and voluntary commitments. It is therefore too soon to speak of EU influence to Brazil, considering the lack of long standing and genuine bilateral cooperation.
Overall, therefore, the EU is engaging emerging powers in bilateral as well as multilateral climate diplomacy. In this way it is making an effort to change the preferences of these states and create a higher level of interest in their governments towards battling climate change. The evidence suggests, however, that the ability of the EU to exert influence is limited and depends on the level of coincidence of interests between the EU and each of the emerging powers. Torney, for example argues that the EU has had more influence in China than in India because of the different constellation of domestic interests in each country​[49]​. Because of this, India was more resistant than China in relation to deepening cooperation. Another issue that limits the EU’s influence is that its member states often compete with each other for commercial contracts in the various emerging economies, rather than working together​[50]​. Therefore, overall the picture on the EU’s bilateral diplomacy with emerging countries is again mixed. It appears that it has been more successful with China, but the extent to which this is a direct result of influence and EU leadership rather than a coincidence of interests could be up for debate. China appears to be the most open to EU influence, and this is of course limited to joint projects. When it comes to translating this influence to China’s negotiating position, no such claims appear valid. China remains firmly opposed to legally binding targets, which is what the EU is firmly committed to achieving.
UK bilateral climate diplomacy 
The UK bilateral climate diplomacy with emerging powers is at a rather under-developed stage. The highest level of cooperation on climate issues is with China. Most of this cooperation is on technical matters, such as helping with recording emissions, building carbon markets and business relations. Several formal agreements exist: the UK-China Action Plan on Climate Change and Energy was established in December 2007 and aims to aid China in its transition to a low carbon economy and to enhance China’s role in delivering a global agreement​[51]​; a UK-China Climate Change Working Group was also established between the Chinese National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and Department for Environment Forestry and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) in December 2006. This working group aims to share knowledge on climate change, and focuses on issues like energy efficiency, adaptation and capacity building activities around the CDM​[52]​. After the mandate of this group expired in 2011, a new memorandum of understanding was signed between the NDRC and the Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC). This new agreement funded several low carbon pilots in China, with a budget of £200,000 a year until 2014​[53]​. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) also funded 52 low carbon projects in China in 2012 as part of its China Prosperity Fund. Another initiative worth mentioning is the UK-China Energy Dialogue, launched in 2010. This included a meeting between the Ministers for Energy in both countries, as well as the opportunity for businesses from both sides to network​[54]​. This list of examples is not exhaustive of the cooperation initiatives with China. 
In addition to formal intergovernmental agreements and initiatives between the two countries, bilateral diplomacy is also exercised by officials of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). The embassy in Beijing has 20 staff members working on climate change as part of the global network of climate attaches​[55]​. The FCO complements the work of DECC in relation to climate diplomacy by working to create the conditions for interest convergence between the UK and China. According to witnesses to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee’s inquiry into the role of the FCO in government, FCO officials showed an inventive style of diplomacy: 
“The teams have reached beyond Governments to work with all sorts of non-state actors within both the business sector and the NGO sector. They have pioneered quite a different way of thinking about diplomacy”​[56]​
The climate relationship with China is also quite heavily based on economic interests, such as exporting British knowhow and technology to China. This is evident from the statements of a number of senior government officials. For example, the current Secretary of State for Energy and Climate, Ed Davey, emphasised the economic benefits of the ‘green industry’ in his speech at Chatham House in July 2012: ‘The UK is 6th in the world in the low-carbon sector, with an industry worth £122 billion. I want us to secure a greater share of this vibrant and growing sector… Green business generated a trade surplus for the UK of £5 billion last year; if we play it right, it could halve our trade deficit before the next election’​[57]​. Similar testimonies are found in the Energy and Climate Change Committee’s report to Parliament about UK-China climate cooperation. The Minister for Trade and Investment said that ‘alignment between the climate change agenda, UKTI and the business opportunities […] is looked at and envied by a lot of other countries’​[58]​. There also seems to be a new emphasis on commercial interests in the FCO since the Coalition government took over in 2010, which the Foreign Affairs Committee report acknowledges​[59]​. This focus on trading opportunities is further exemplified by the hosting of the London Clean Energy Finance Summit, a UK government initiative to bring together investors (including from the City of London), developers and ministers from various countries to discuss investment opportunities in low energy​[60]​. Therefore the engagement with China does not only aim to enhance Chinese capacities and influence Chinese climate policy, but also aims to enhance business opportunities for the UK. 
In relation to exercising influence, there is clear evidence of policy diffusion: a report by the House of Commons Committee on Energy and Climate Change on UK-China cooperation found that there was a lot of interest in China about the UK Climate Change Act and the concept of carbon budgets​[61]​. Also, the UK was the only country offering ‘dedicated partnership to China in its low carbon pilot efforts’​[62]​ and this seems to have enhanced the potential for UK influence. The diplomatic work of the FCO has also been praised in terms of promoting UK perceptions of climate policy solutions to China:
“The FCO has become engaged in building coalitions of interest to support ambitious outcomes among business, science, NGOs, faith groups and the media within key nations. This activity not only provides support for UK climate negotiators, but also gives us influence over others’ economic and political choices. This was acknowledged, for example, by the Chinese government who have attributed the concept of low carbon economy they are now pursuing with vigour to the UK”​[63]​. 
On the other hand the report of the Committee on Energy and Climate Change also found that there is a lack of strategic direction in UK-China cooperation, and too many projects are being pursued, but with limited financing and limited ability to make a difference​[64]​. In terms of coordination, the report proposes the creation of a cross-departmental committee to provide high-level strategic direction to the UK’s low-carbon cooperation with China​[65]​. 
Equally important are the limitations on finance. Although the UK played a key role in establishing low carbon zones in China, it has not been able to provide enough funding for their successful implementation​[66]​. The money available is not large enough to make an impact in such a large scale​[67]​, and due to the recession and austerity the pot is shrinking: for example the FCO’s Prosperity Fund spend £5 million to support climate change activities in China in 2011-12, itself not a very large amount, which shrunk to £4.5 million in 2012-13​[68]​. Further slashing of funding in the FCO climate budget has seen overall spending on climate activities reduced by 39% in the last three years (2011-2014)​[69]​.  The Foreign Affairs Committee voiced concerns over the ability of the FCO to fulfil the ambitious mandate it has been given by the Coalition government considering the increased lack of resources​[70]​. There are also concerns that climate change has been diminishing in priority since 2010 and that the new Foreign Secretary to replace William Hague, Phillip Hammond has even less of an interest in climate change​[71]​. This is likely to diminish the effectiveness of FCO diplomacy vis-a-vis China and other emerging countries.
The above discussion indicates that the UK has developed a beneficial climate relationship with China, is engaged in cooperation and able to diffuse policy and thus exercise some influence in relation to the development of domestic Chinese climate policy. Again, however, it is important not to overemphasise the UK’s influence, since policy development in China is as much, if not more, a process of domestic politics​[72]​. Perhaps the term lesson drawing is more appropriate than policy diffusion. Equally, similarly to the EU efforts, bilateral cooperation and diplomacy has not moved China closer to the UK position on the adoption of a legally binding agreement in the context of climate negotiations.
UK climate diplomacy is less developed with India and even less so with Brazil. In relation to India, there are very few formalised levels of engagement, such as they are with China. An India-UK High Level Dialogue on Sustainable Development exists, but no particular agreements on climate change. The office of the British High Commission in New Delhi includes a Climate Change and Energy Unit to coordinate the efforts of different government departments’ work in India (DECC, DEFRA, Department for International Development (DFID) and FCO). However, parliamentary scrutiny of the engagement with India found that there was very little transparency in relation to what this office does, or how different issues are integrated between the work of different departments​[73]​. The low level of formalisation of relations may be a result of the UK putting less emphasis on India than China, which reflects their relative contribution to global emissions (or a the more limited business opportunities in India); or, like it is the case with the EU, India might be resisting more formalised relations in order to avoid pressure to adjust its policies. 
In relation to Brazil, again cooperation is less widespread than it is with China. A UK-Brazil High-Level Dialogue on Sustainable Development was established in 2006​[74]​; some projects on biofuels and waste management have taken place through this framework. Surprisingly little information is available about UK-Brazil climate cooperation, either in the press or in government sources. Perhaps this reflects the fact that UK-Brazilian relations were not a high priority to UK foreign policy in recent decades​[75]​. In more recent years more attention is paid to enhancing this relationship, but it will take time to develop. Some encouraging signs include the fact that the UK and Brazil delegations found a lot of common ground and cooperated closely in the Cancun Climate Conference in 2010​[76]​. However, this signifies more a coincidence of interests rather than UK influence, since Brazil is the most progressive amongst the emerging countries when it comes to climate negotiations. The amount to which the UK can influence Brazilian climate politics is limited because of the lack of a close diplomatic relationship between the two countries. In the words of Jeremy Browne MP, the FCO Minister with responsibility for South America: ‘Brazil is well disposed towards us (the UK), but it does not give us automatic bonus points that are not earned in terms of our relationship with it’​[77]​. Therefore, again the UK is making an effort to engage Brazil as an emerging power and important player in the climate regime, but this engagement is recent and not based on long-standing foundations. Judging by the problems plaguing the efforts to engage China, particularly the lack of resources, the UK is likely to face issues with Brazil as well, especially in comparison with other European countries, like Germany and Italy, who already have more established relations with Brazil​[78]​.
In conclusion, the UK’s bilateral diplomacy with emerging powers is still at a relatively early stage of development, particularly in relation to India and Brazil. The efforts to engage these rising powers on a bilateral basis are plagued with problems of cross-departmental coordination, and, more importantly, a lack of resources, particularly in terms of financing projects in order to make an impact. These bilateral diplomatic efforts are also not emphasised in UK government discourse in terms of their contribution to a potential climate agreement. For example, the previous Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, Chris Huhne, emphasised the importance of working through the EU and the UNFCCC to achieve international cooperation on climate change in his speech at Chatham House in 2011, where he elaborated his ‘climate change doctrine’​[79]​. No mention of bilateral diplomacy with the emerging powers figured in his speech, indicating the emphasis is elsewhere. His successor, Ed Davey, also gave a similar speech in Chatham House, where he also exalted the virtues of working with the EU and through multilateral mechanisms such as the UNFCCC, without really mentioning any bilateral diplomacy efforts with emerging powers​[80]​. Perhaps this is because the bilateral relations are meant to complement the multilateral process and aid to the achievement of a global deal. Also, as seen in the relationship with China, to some extent bilateral climate diplomacy is also meant to deliver economic gains in the form of business contracts.
All in all, the UK does engage emerging powers on climate change, both in a bilateral and multilateral basis. This engagement is relatively recent, reflecting an increased realisation of the importance of emerging countries in the climate regime and on other global issues. It might therefore take a while for these efforts to bear fruit, although some positive results are already evident in cooperation with China. In addition, since each emerging country forms its climate policy through a complex process, involving domestic politics, the multilateral process, and a variety of external relations, UK and EU influence cannot be completely decisive, although it can play a constructive role. 
It would appear that the best that can be hoped for from cultivating bilateral relationships with emerging countries would be an involvement and influence of their domestic climate policy trajectories. Without underestimating the importance of this, the prospects of influencing the foreign climate policies of emerging countries appear less promising. The long-standing positions of BASIC countries on CBDR and voluntary as opposed to legally binding commitments do not at present seem open to change through diplomatic pressure or bilateral cooperation.
It is important also to recognise that emerging powers are not only passive receptors to climate diplomacy of established powers, but they are significant climate actors on their own right. Their increased economic clout and their gradual interest in the issue of climate change means they are also promoting their own vision of climate governance and they exercise climate diplomacy of their own​[81]​. South-South cooperation on climate is becoming more widespread and this signifies that emerging countries are not only receptors of influence but seek to influence developments in climate policy themselves. It is therefore important that EU and UK climate diplomacy with emerging countries is not approached as a top down issue on the part of established powers, but as a matter of cooperation between equals​[82]​.

Conclusion
This paper discussed the leadership ambitions of the UK in the field of climate politics, and particularly scrutinised the level of engagement of the UK government with emerging countries. The UK’s climate diplomacy does seem to suggest a recognition of the importance of emerging countries, and attempts are being made to secure climate cooperation with these countries. A lot of this diplomacy is soft, focusing on development and economic/technological cooperation rather than direct diplomatic pressure to encourage more ambitious climate policies in those countries. This accurately reflects the UK’s resources and limited leverage as an individual country, since it is not a significant emitter in its own right. 
The UK also coordinates its efforts with EU states in order to increase its leverage in international negotiations. This is also a reasonable strategy, which could be however further strengthened. Competition for commercial contracts between the EU member states harms the overall leverage that the EU can have in its climate relations with emerging countries. Since the UK wants to play a leading role  within Europe, it could work with other member states that have strong climate credentials to create a more streamlined EU approach. It is important to note, however, that the potential for EU influence is also limited by the fact that emerging countries are largely symmetrical in power to the EU and have a strong embedded perception of their interests in the context of climate negotiations. 
Despite the fact that the UK and the EU have limited ability to affect the negotiating position of emerging countries, continued cooperation and bilateral diplomacy efforts can bring benefits to both established and emerging powers. It is clear that commercial benefits are being sought on all sides, and policy emulation and lesson drawing is happening, particularly in the case of China. Emerging countries are also modifying their position on climate change based on their own assessment of their vulnerability, as well as the possible economic and energy security benefits of climate mitigation measures. Despite continued divergence in international negotiations, domestic agendas are showing signs of convergence, and further bilateral cooperation can only build on and ameliorate these trends.  
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